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Abstract—We investigate the problem of maintaining an en-
coded distributed storage system when some nodes contain
adversarial errors. Using the error-correction capabilities that
are built into the existing redundancy of the system, we propose
a simple linear hashing scheme to detect errors in the storage
nodes. Our main result is that for storing a data object of
total size M using an (n, k) MDS code over a ﬁnite ﬁeld
Fq , up to t1 = (n − k)/2 errors can be detected, with
probability of failure smaller than 1/M, by communicating only
O(n(n−k) logM) bits to a trusted veriﬁer. Our result constructs
small projections of the data that preserve the errors with high
probability and builds on a pseudorandom generator that fools
linear functions. The transmission rate achieved by our scheme is
asymptotically equal to the min-cut capacity between the source
and any receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study the security and data integrity of distributed
storage systems that use coding for redundancy. It is well
known that maximum distance separable (MDS) codes can
offer maximum reliability for a given storage overhead and
can be used for distributed storage in data centers and peer-to-
peer storage systems like OceanStore [1], Total Recall [2], and
FS2You [3], that use nodes across the Internet for distributed
ﬁle storage and sharing. In this paper we are interested
in dealing with errors in the encoded representation. The
errors could be introduced either through (unlikely) hard drive
undetected failures or through a malicious or compromised
server in the storage network.
This second threat is much more eminent when the sys-
tem uses network coding to maintain the redundancy of the
encoded system as proposed recently [4]. To illustrate this
consider a large data object that has size M bits. If this
object is to be stored on n servers, depending on the desired
redundancy, an (n, k) linear MDS code can be used, dividing
the object into k packets of size M/k each, and storing an
encoded packet at each server. Assuming the code is over a
ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq , requiring log q bits to represent each symbol,
each server will also need to keep a header denoting the coding
coefﬁcients of the linear combinations stored on the server (see
section II for the details) and the size of this header is larger
than the size of the useful data if the code is used only once.
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Fig. 1. A (4, 2) MDS code along with the repair of the ﬁrst storage node.
Each node stores two packets and any two nodes contain enough information
to recover all four data packets. In this example the ﬁrst node leaves the system
and a new node is formed by communicating linear combinations f2, f3, f4
which can be used to solve for x1, x2 at the new node.
For this reason it was proposed that the same code is used
several times [5] by dividing each packet into N symbols of
log q bits and repeating the same code N times. If N >> n
the overhead of storing the coefﬁcients becomes negligible.
We refer to this as the N–extended version of an MDS code,
shown in Figure 2 for the (4, 2) code used in Figure 1.
Observe that in this example, each node is storing two
linear combinations, (rows) as opposed to one. This sub-
packetization is performed to facilitate repair through network
coding as proposed in [4]. The problem of repair consists
of constructing a new encoded node by accessing as little
information from existing encoded nodes. In the example of
Figure 1, we assume that the ﬁrst storage node failed and
the redundancy of the system needs to be refreshed. This
is achieved by communicating “small” linear combinations
f2, f3, f4 of the encoded packets from nodes 2, 3, and 4 each
of size 1/2 of what each node is storing, which as proven
in [4], is information theoretically minimal. As storage nodes
leave the system and new ones are added, this forms a dynamic
storage network that keeps a ﬁxed redundancy and reliability
by building new encoded packets from already existing ones.
The problem of security should now be clear: even if a single
node in this storage system is compromised and participates
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in this repair process, then it can send incorrect linear com-
binations that will create erroneous packets at the new nodes.
All new nodes using these linear equations will have incorrect
data and soon the whole system will be contaminated with
nodes having erroneous data.
Our contribution: Since the problem of repairing a code is
equivalent to wireline network coding [4], existing techniques
for network error correction can be used to detect and correct
the errors [6], [7]. These techniques are designed to work for
general networks and always guarantee a transmission rate of
C−2z, where C is the min-cut capacity from the source to the
destination and z is the number of links contaminated by the
adversary. Our approach, that is creating and communicating
small linear hashes which preserve the structure of the code,
allows the detection of errors and achieves a transmission
rate that can be asymptotically equal to C (by having the
receiver connecting to all the non-erroneous nodes) since it
takes advantage of the speciﬁc structure of the network and
the set of links an adversary can contaminate.
To explain our scheme, consider the (4, 2) MDS code of
Figure 1 and assume one of the four nodes contains errors
(say in both rows). A trusted veriﬁer that communicates with
all four nodes can ﬁnd this error by getting the 8 equations
contained in each of the
(
4
2
)
= 6 node pairs. Since this is
a (4, 2) MDS code, the combinations of equations that come
from error-free nodes will be full rank and give a consistent
solution whereas the other sets will give different solutions
(or might not even be full rank). This is, of course, just
using the error-correction capability of the code to detect an
error. Our contribution involves using this idea to the N -
extended version of a code, by creating a linear projection
(hash) of each row on the same random vector. The key
observation is that if the same random projection is used,
this creates an error-correcting code for the hashes which
can be communicated to the veriﬁer. The beneﬁt is that each
hash has size only 1/N of the data in each row reducing the
amount of communication to the veriﬁer. One complication is
that each node needs to project its data on the same random
vector of length N , which requires N log q bits of common
randomness. Subsequently the problem at the veriﬁer is to
decode an error-correcting code under adversarial errors. This
decoding task can be computationally inefﬁcient but we do not
address this issue here, assuming that the veriﬁer can detect the
errors if they are within the error correcting capabilities of the
code as dictated by the minimum distance (half the minimum
distance). Our analysis investigates under which conditions the
small projected hash code will detect any error in the large
amount of data stored at the nodes. In particular, we prove the
following
Theorem 1: In a distributed storage system storing a total
of M bits, using an N–extended (n, k) MDS code over Fq ,
with the n storage nodes sharing O(M) bits of common
randomness, our random hashing scheme can detect up to
t ≤ t1 ≡ (n − k)/2 errors by communicating a total of
n(n − k)(logM + log t1) bits to a veriﬁer, with probability
of failure
P[F ] ≤ 1M .
One important weakness of the previous result is the large
common randomness required which is comparable to the total
size of the data object stored (1/k(n− k) fraction of the M
bits). Note that these bits do not have to be a secret, they only
need to be realized after the error has been introduced to the
new disk. Their large number, however, makes it impractical
to generate them at one node and then communicate them to
the others. Our second contribution involves showing how to
use only O(logM) bits of common randomness to achieve
almost the same performance:
Theorem 2: In a distributed storage system storing a total
of M bits, using an N–extended (n, k) MDS code over Fq ,
with the n storage nodes sharing O(logM) bits of common
randomness, our pseudorandom hashing scheme can detect
up to t1 = (n − k)/2 errors by communicating a total of
O(n(n − k) logM) bits to the veriﬁer, with probability of
failure
P[F ′] ≤ 1M .
If there is no common randomness, the veriﬁer can generate
the O(logM) random bits and communicate these to all the
nodes requiring a total of O(n logM) extra communicated
bits.
Notice that in this case the total number of bits com-
municated scales only logarithmically in M, to achieve a
probability of failure that scales like 1/M. Our construction
relies on the pseudorandom small-bias generator used in [8]
which can expand logN random symbols of Fq (which require
logN log q random bits to generate), into N pseudorandom
symbols that can “fool” any linear function1. The only modi-
ﬁcation to our algorithm is projecting each stored row on this
pseudorandom vector to generate each hash and this induces
only a small addition to the probability of error. Notice that
our work does not rely on any cryptographic assumptions and
guarantees that errors inserted in the distributed storage system
will be detected with high probability if they are within the
capabilities of the code used.
Using the error-correction capability of the code for dis-
tributed storage has been suggested before as a way to detect
errors [10], [11] and identify “free riders” within the network.
A different approach to ﬁnd errors injected in distributed
storage and content distribution systems is the use of sig-
natures and hash functions. Reference [12] introduced the
use of homomorphic hashing functions that enables a nodes
to perform on-the-ﬂy veriﬁcation of erasure-encoded blocks.
Gkantsidis et al. [13] used the computationally less expensive
secure random checksums to detect polluted packets in content
distribution system that use network coding while [14], [15]
used a method of subspace signatures based on different
cryptographic primitives. See also [16], [17], [18] for other
related work on security and distributed storage.
1First introduced by Naor and Naor in [9] for linear functions in F2.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the 3–extended version of the (4, 2) MDS code shown in Figure 1. Each of the three columns stored on the source nodes is coded
by repeatedly using the (4, 2) MDS of Figure 1. During veriﬁcation, each row is projected on the vector rT = (1 1 1) and the corresponding products
S1, . . . , S4 form a codeword of the initial (4, 2) MDS code. For example, the errors at the ﬁrst row of the ﬁrst node will not be absorbed by the projection
as long as (e11 e12 e13) ∗ (1 1 1)T = 0
II. MODEL
As stated, we consider a data object of size M bits that is
divided into k pieces (of size M/k bits each) and these are
coded into n (> k) encoded pieces through a linear (n, k)
maximum distance separable (MDS) code. These encoded
pieces are stored on n distinct storage nodes along with a
header denoting the exact linear combination saved at all the
storage nodes. Since the size of the code (n, k) will be much
smaller than N , the overhead of storing the code description
everywhere (including the veriﬁer) is minimal. This simpliﬁes
the model and we can now assume that the errors occur only
at the data, since an error at the header would be immediately
detected.
We assume that the original information (of size M bits)
is organized into a matrix X with k(n − k) rows and N
columns. The elements of this matrix are elements of the
ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq, i.e., X ∈ Fqk(n−k)×N where q is a prime or
an integer power of a prime. Each column Xci ∈ Fqk(n−k)×1
(i ∈ {1, . . . , N}) of matrix X will be separately encoded
with the use of an (n, k) MDS code with generator matrix
G ∈ Fqn(n−k)×k(n−k) and all the columns GXci ∈ Fqn(n−k)×1
derived by this encoding will be stored on the n different
storage nodes of the distributed storage system. We will call
this code applied to the N different columns of matrix X as
the N–extended MDS code. The overall effect that the N–
extended MDS code has upon the information matrix X is
captured by the matrix multiplication GX . Figure 2 shows
such a code for N = 3 where the MDS code used is the same
as the one shown in Figure 1.
The storage nodes of the distributed storage system are
assumed to have limited computational capabilities allowing
them only to perform inexpensive operations over the ﬁnite
ﬁeld Fq . Some of these storage nodes are assumed to store
erroneous information, where these errors might be either
random due to hardware failures or inserted adversarially by
a malicious user. The malicious user can be computationally
unbounded, have knowledge of all the information stored on
the distributed storage system and can insert errors to any t
of the storage nodes.
We assume the existence of a special node called the veriﬁer
that is assigned to check the integrity of the data stored on
different storage nodes. The veriﬁer does not have access to
the initial data object (other than the description of the code)
and therefore has to rely on the communicated information to
check which nodes contain errors.
III. RANDOM HASHES
A. Illustrating example
Assume that in the distributed storage system shown in
Figure 2 with four storage nodes it is known that one of
them (the ﬁrst in this example) stores erroneous information.
The goal of the veriﬁer that overlooks the state of the whole
system is ﬁrst to ﬁnd the erroneous disk with the minimum
data exchange and second to repair it by using the information
stored on the other disks. Since all three columns stored on
the distributed storage system are codewords of a (4, 2) MDS
code with at most one error (some columns might be error
free) and minimum distance d = 3, the naı¨ve approach to
ﬁnd the erroneous disk is to download all data from different
disks and then by using minimum distance decoding on each
separate column one would be able to ﬁnd the erroneous disk.
The naı¨ve approach would certainly ﬁnd the faulty disk but
it would require the transfer of double the size of the ﬁle stored
(nkM bits of information in general). So as the size of the ﬁle
increases this approach will become prohibitively expensive in
bandwidth. Instead of transmitting all the information stored
on the distributed storage system, the central node could
choose a vector with each component chosen independently
and uniformly at random from Fq and have each storage node
transmit the inner product (called the hash product) between
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the randomly chosen vector and each of the rows stored at the
disks. In the absence of errors, these hash products will form
a codeword of the MDS code used to encode the different
columns of the information matrix. In case there are errors,
as in the case of the ﬁrst node in Figure 2, the multiplication
with the random vector will not obscure these errors unless
Sei = 0 ⇔ ei1 + ei2 + ei3 = 0, for i = {1, 2}. The
reason why the chosen vector should be random is so that
the adversary can not deliberately choose the errors to make
them ”disappear” after the vector multiplication.
B. General case
The initial information matrix X ∈ Fqn(n−k)×N is coded
with the use of an N -extended MDS code with generator ma-
trix G ∈ Fqn(n−k)×k(n−k). Some of the storage nodes contain
errors and therefore what is actually stored on the distributed
storage system is Y = GX + E where Y,E ∈ Fqn(n−k)×N
and E is the error matrix. The veriﬁer wants to identify all
erroneous disks by sending hash product requests to all nodes.
Then the following theorem holds:
Proof of Theorem 1: All storage nodes share N log q bits
of common randomness and therefore they can create the same
random vector r ∈ FqN×1 with each component of vector r
drawn uniformly at random from Fq . After the random vector
r is computed, each storage node calculates the hash product–
inner product–between the random vector r and its content on
every row. These n(n− k) hash products are equal to:
H = Y r = (GX + E)r ⇔ H = G(Xr) + e (1)
where e = Er ∈ Fqn(n−k)×1 is a column vector with at most
tm non-zero components representing the erroneous disks
(these non-zero components must correspond to the position of
at most tm storage nodes with errors). The key observation is
that the projection will not identify an error pattern at a speciﬁc
row if vector r is orthogonal to that row of E. Intuitively, a
randomly selected r will be non-orthogonal to an arbitrary row
of E with high probability and this is the probability we need
to analyze.
From equation (1) it can be seen that the order of applying
the MDS encoding on the different columns of the information
matrix X and the calculation of the hash products can be
interchanged ((GX)r = G(Xr)) making the process of
identifying the erroneous disks equivalent to ﬁnding the error
positions in a regular MDS code that is guaranteed to succeed
if the minimum distance of the code (n−k+1) is larger than
twice the number of errors 2t (that is indeed satisﬁed by the
assumptions of Theorem 1).
The set of indices that correspond to the components of
vector e that come from disk i is Ri = {(i − 1)(n − k) +
1, . . . , i(n−k)}. We are interested in vector e since this gives
us the positions of the faulty disks. One complication that
might arise is the fact that disk i might contain an error,
meaning that rows {Erj , j ∈ Ri} of the error matrix E are
not all zero whereas the corresponding components of vector
e ({ej , j ∈ Ri}) turn out to be zero and therefore our scheme
fails to detect that error. Assume that the set of erroneous disks
is W ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} and deﬁne P[F ] to be the probability of
failing to detect some errors. We get
P[F ] = P
⎡
⎣ ⋃
i∈W
⎧⎨
⎩
⋂
j∈Ri
(
Erj r = 0
)
⎫⎬
⎭
⎤
⎦
≤
∑
i∈W
P
⎡
⎣ ⋂
j∈Ri
(Erj r = 0)
⎤
⎦ ∗≤∑
i∈W
1
q
≤ 
n−k
2 
q
≡ t1
q
(2)
where inequality (∗) holds due to the fact that the probability
that some storage node with errors produce zero hash products
is less than 1/qf where f is the number of linearly independent
errors rows saved at its disk. So by assuming that the adversary
has produced linearly dependent errors would only increase the
probability of failure.
If the adversary has saved error vectors at storage node i
with rank 1 then the probability P[ ∩
j∈Ri
(Erj r = 0)] in equation
(2) reduces to an equation for a single row (assuming row k):
P
⎡
⎣ ∑
ekf =0
ekf rf = 0
⎤
⎦ = P
⎡
⎣rf = − ∑
ekf′ =0
ekf ′
ekf
rf ′
⎤
⎦ = 1
q
where we only took the terms with a non-zero error coefﬁcient
ekf . The numbers (ekf ′/ekf ) rf ′ (ekf is any non-zero error
element from the kth row) are independent and uniform over
Fq and so is their sum according to Lemma 1. So the last
equality holds since two independent uniformly distributed
over Fq random numbers are equal with probability 1/q.
When the errors have rank f > 1 then the probability
P[ ∩
j∈Ri
(Erj r = 0)] can be evaluated by disregarding the
linearly dependent rows. By looking only at the linearly inde-
pendent ones and by choosing f columns we can formulate an
invertible submatrix Eˆi ∈ Fqf×f and similarly to the previous
analysis we have that P[ ∩
j∈Ri
(Erj r = 0)] = P[Eˆi rˆ = bˆ] where
rˆ, bˆ ∈ F f×1 where rˆ are the components of the random vector
that correspond to the columns where the submatrix Eˆi was
formed. Since bˆ is uniformly random, due to the previous
analysis P[Eˆ rˆ = b] = 1/qf .
Each of the n storage nodes has to convey to the veriﬁer the
result of the hash product from all its (n-k) rows, so that the
total size of the hash communicated is H = n(n − k) log q,
whereas the size of the ﬁle M = k(n − k)N log q. By
substituting the ﬁeld q equal to n−k2 M we conclude the
proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: The sum of any number of independent uni-
formly distributed random variables gives a uniformly dis-
tributed random variable.
Proof: Without loss of generality we will prove Lemma 1
only for the case of two random variables. Assume that
x, y ∈ Fq are two independent and uniformly distributed
random variables. We will prove that x + y is also uniformly
distributed, indeed ∀t1, t2 ∈ Fq:
P[x + y = t1] =
∑
t2∈Fq
P[x = t1 − y|y = t2]P[y = t2]
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(∗)
=
∑
t2∈Fq
P[x = t1 − t2] · 1
q
=
∑
t2∈Fq
1
q
· 1
q
= q · 1
q2
=
1
q
where equality (*) holds due to the independence between x
and y.
Before we continue to prove Theorem 2 we need to give
the following deﬁnition (extension of Deﬁnition 2.1 in [8] to
non-prime numbers):
Deﬁnition 1: a) Let q be a prime or an integer power of
a prime. For a random variable X with values in Fq , let the
bias of X be deﬁned by
bias(X) = (q − 1)P[X = 0]− P[X = 0]
A random variable X ∈ Fq is -biased if |bias(X) ≤ |.
b) The sample space S ⊆ Fq is -biased if for all c ∈ Fq and
each sequence β = (β1, ..., β) ∈ Fqn\{0} the following is
valid: if a sequence X = (x1, . . . , x) ∈ S is chosen uniformly
at random from S, then the random variable (∑i=1 βixi + c)
is -biased.
Proof of Theorem 2: All storage nodes execute the
algorithm described in Proposition 4.12 of [8] and produces
a pseudorandom vector r′ ∈ FqN×1 with N components. The
quantity m in the algorithm (and consequently the ﬁeld size
Fqm too) is chosen so that the bias (q−1)(N−1)/qm is equal
to 1 and therefore qm = (q − 1)(N − 1) or m = O(logN).
The size of the necessary seed that needs to be provided
at all the storage nodes so that they can start the algorithm
is two elements from Fqm chosen uniformly at random or
equivalently 2m log q ≡ O(logN) random bits.
Once all storage nodes have constructed the same pseu-
dorandom vector r′ they compute the inner product between
vector r′ and the content stored on each row of the storage
nodes. These pseudorandom products are all sent to the veriﬁer
to identify the erroneous disks. The whole analysis is identical
to the proof of Theorem 1 with one major difference in the
calculation of failure probability P[F ′]. For the case of a
pseudorandom vector r′, using the same notation as in the
proof of Theorem 1:
P[F ′] = P
⎡
⎣ ⋃
i∈W
⎧⎨
⎩
⋂
j∈Ri
(
Erj r
′ = 0
)
⎫⎬
⎭
⎤
⎦
≤
∑
i∈W
P
⎡
⎣ ⋃
j∈Ri
(
Erj r
′ = 0
)
⎤
⎦ ≤ ∑
i∈W
∑
j∈Ri
P
(
Erj r
′ = 0
)
∗≤(n− k)n− k
2
2
q
≡ 2(n− k)t1
q
where inequality (∗) holds since P (Erj r′ = 0) = 2/q. Indeed
the bias of the space constructed by the pseudorandom proce-
dure is 1 that means:∣∣(q − 1)P (Erj r′ = 0)− P (Erj r′ = 0)∣∣ ≤ 1
⇔ ∣∣(q − 1)P (Erj r′ = 0)− [1− P (Erj r′ = 0)]∣∣ ≤ 1
2This algorithm is described for q prime but it is readily extensible to q
equal to an integer power of a prime.
⇔ ∣∣qP (Erj r′ = 0)− 1∣∣ ≤ 1 ⇒ P (Erj r′ = 0) ≤ 2q
By setting q = 2(n− k)t1M we conclude the proof.
We would like to underline here that both theorems above
exhibit the same behavior on the probability. In Theorem 2 the
size of the required common randomness is decreased in the
expense of an increased ﬁeld size. Moreover the use of pseu-
dorandom generators incurs the additional computational cost
at each storage node of O(Nm2) or O(M logM) operations
in Fq to generate the pseudorandom vector r′.
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